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If You Can’t Beat Them – Manage Them: Appointments of Governors, Political Competition and Raiding in the Regions of Russia
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If You Can’t Beat Them – Manage Them: Appointments of Governors, Political Competition and Raiding in the Regions of Russia
Annotation
PII
S086904990009196-7-
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Anton Kazun 
Occupation: Research fellow at the International center for research on institutions and development, Institute for enterprise and market analysis, national research University Higher school of Economics"
Affiliation: International center for the study of institutions and development of the Institute for analysis of enterprises and markets Of the national research University Higher school of Economics"
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Edition
Issue 2
Pages
108-120
Abstract

Until 2010, the Russian federal elite could turn a blind eye to violent pressure on business in regions in exchange for high results for the ruling party at the federal elections. Based on the analysis of public information on violent pressure on business from 2011 to 2016 collected by Center of Public Procedures “Business against corruption” we show that the economic crisis could force the authorities to reconsider this informal agreement. Since attempts to centralize raiding were ineffective, the government started to use an additional tool to manage violence associated with the appointments of the governors. We believe that the control of violent pressure on business has become part of the responsibilities of the new governors, and the ability to fulfill these responsibilities is related to the level of political competition in the region. In regions with relatively high political competition, control over violence is achieved through the creation for consensus between the elite groups, in regions where there is practically no competition on regional elections, the model of authoritarian control over violent pressure on business is possible.

Keywords
Elections, governors, regions of Russia, raiding, violent pressure on business
Received
15.04.2020
Date of publication
27.04.2020
Number of purchasers
37
Views
1995
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0.0 (0 votes)
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S086904990009196-7-1 Дата внесения правок в статью - 09.04.2020
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