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Spontaneous demand for institutional change: towards a behavioral theory of public choice
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Spontaneous demand for institutional change: towards a behavioral theory of public choice
Annotation
PII
S086904990009198-9-
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Andrey Shastitko 
Occupation: Head of the Department of competition and industrial policy, faculty of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow state University; Director (Ranepa) under the President of the Russian Federation
Affiliation:
Lomonosov Moscow state University
Ranepa under the President of the Russian Federation
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Olga Markova
Affiliation:
Lomonosov Moscow state University
Ranepa under the President of the Russian Federation
HSE
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Edition
Issue 2
Pages
132-144
Abstract

The shift from the status quo of the majority of modern, following the everyday routine people may be associated with leaving their comfort zone and even with a significant decrease in their life quality. In this respect, one can question the possible reasons of why people choose to spontaneously protest and even take part in riots, that may likely lead to the degradation of existing social order. The authors discuss in this article the possible causes of spontaneous demand for institutional changes using the results from public choice and behavioral economics literature. Particularly, the authors consider the issues of constitutional choice in the light of spontaneous changes, focal points and the snowball, endowment, latent radicalization effects. The authors conclude with the possible risks associated with spontaneous demand for institutional changes.

Keywords
Constitutional choice, public choice, behavioral economics, endowment effect, focal points
Received
16.04.2020
Date of publication
27.04.2020
Number of purchasers
37
Views
2221
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0.0 (0 votes)
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